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Abstract
German municipalities have substantial autonomy in setting taxes on two dis-
tinct tax bases: business profits and property values. We use this setting and
a two-step approach to explore whether implemented tax policy is consistent
with the seminal inverse-elasticity rule. First, we estimate the tax elasticity of
the two tax bases using event-study and generalized differences-in-differences
methods based on the universe of municipalities in 1995-2010. Second, we
compare the ratio of the observed tax rates for the two tax bases to the ratio
of their estimated elasticities. We find that property is not very responsive to
variation in tax rates, whereas business profits respond significantly. While
this would suggest that property should be taxed at a higher rate, the data
show that this not the case: most municipalities impose relatively higher rates
on business profits. This suggests that municipality-level taxation in Germany
is inconsistent with the inverse-elasticity rule. We provide suggestive evidence
that this finding is explained by politician’s imprecise expectations about rev-
enue elasticities as well as re-election concerns.
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1 Introduction
The seminal contribution of Ramsey (1927) shows that optimal tax rates on goods
depend inversely on their elasticity of demand. While the optimal-tax literature has
made progress since Ramsey’s initial contribution, the general idea of his framework
has not lost ground: the excess burden of taxation is positively related to the sen-
sitivity of the tax base, and the tax rate should be inversely related to a tax base’s
tax sensitivity. In the case of two tax bases, for example, Ramsey taxation suggests
to impose a higher tax rate on the tax base that is relatively less responsive to tax-
rate changes.1 One important question that arises in this context is: do real-world
policy makers apply the rules of Ramsey by imposing different tax rates on goods
with different tax elasticities? In other words: does tax policy set higher tax rates
on goods that are less responsive to taxation relative to more responsive goods?
Evidence on this question is scarce, and the reasons for this scarcity are twofold.
First, in order to ensure comparability between the tax rates on different goods, one
requires an institutional setting where tax rates on distinct taxable goods are set by
the same institutional players and the taxed goods are subject to similar economic
conditions. Second, since tax elasticities are to be estimated empirically, a set-
up is required that allows credible empirical identification of the tax sensitivity of
the taxed goods of interest. In this paper, we address the research question in an
empirical set-up that meets both requirements. We explore the unique case of local
taxation on the municipal level in Germany, where more than 11,000 municipalities
have autonomy to set taxes on business profits and property values. This empirical
playground allows us to identify how changes in business and property taxes affect
the respective tax revenues,2 and hence makes it possible to evaluate local taxation
in Germany with respect to relative tax elasticities in the spirit of Ramsey. We
particularly study whether different elasticities of the business-tax and property-tax
1Ramsey’s original framework is about minimizing the deadweight loss of indirect taxes, and
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show in an optimal-tax framework that production should not be
distorted at all. However, the general rationale of Ramsey taxation yet also applies to other types
of taxes. For example, the recent literature on the elasticity of taxable income (surveyed by Saez
et al. 2012) concludes that optimal labor income taxes decrease with the mobility of the income-
tax base. In a similar vein, optimal corporate taxes depend on the mobility of the firm tax base
(Kawano and Slemrod 2015; Devereux et al. 2014). Mankiw et al. (2009) and Piketty and Saez
(2013) survey the current status of the optimal-tax literature.
2Note that there is a direct link between tax-revenue elasticities and tax-base elasticities: a high
tax-revenue elasticity w.r.t. tax rates implies a low (in absolute terms) elasticity of the tax base
w.r.t. taxes, and vice versa (see Section 4 for a detailed exposition of this rationale). We estimate
the effect on tax revenues, rather than tax bases, because of data restrictions: the statistical offices
do not provide long panel data on tax bases. Calculating the base as tax revenue divided by tax
rate is not an option because of unobserved deductions and credits (Fossen and Steiner 2014) and
because we do not have information on the distribution of property types in the municipalities.
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revenue, which we estimate empirically, translate into actual tax-policy following
the inverse-elasticity rule (which is an advancement of the standard Ramsey result;
see Baumol and Bradford 1970).
Our data set covers the full universe of German municipalities in a long panel
of 16 years, 1995-2010. For identification, we rely on many (business and property)
tax-rate reforms that were implemented by the municipalities, and use event studies
and generalized Differences-in-Differences (DiD) regressions to estimate the effects.
The long panel dimension, along with the fact that the municipalities operate in a
very homogeneous economic environment, allows us to control for many confounding
factors that present potential threats to common trend assumptions. As opposed to
many other empirical tax studies, we do not have to deal with changes in the tax
base definitions that often come along with tax reforms, because the tax base, as
well as a basic tax rate, is defined on the federal level and municipalities only set
a multiplier on the exogenous basic rate and base.3 We exploit within-municipality
variation over time to study how elastically business-tax and property-tax revenues
respond to tax changes. While our event studies establish flat pre-reform trends, we
estimate the magnitude of the treatment effects in the DiD setting.4
The event studies show that trends in revenues are flat before tax reforms,
lending credibility to our identification strategy. Using the DiD regressions to quan-
tify the effects, we find that that business-tax revenue does not significantly increase
in response to tax changes. Property-tax revenue, on the other hand, increases by
0.67% in response to a 1% increase in the tax rate. These results imply that the
business-tax base responds strongly to tax-rate changes whereas the property-tax
base is not tax sensitive.5 If tax policy was consistent with the inverse-elasticity
rule, our estimates would suggest that tax rates are significantly higher on immobile
property than on mobile business profits. However, this is not what we observe.
In almost all years of our sample period, the share of municipalities with a higher
business tax than property tax is considerably greater than 50%. In addition, the
average business-tax rate is greater than the average property-tax rate in all years
of our sample period. Our results are robust to a vast set of sensitivity checks.
3Due to data-access limitations and the non-existence of the long panel dimension out of a single
data source, these data have not been used extensively by researchers. Notable exceptions include
Buettner (2003) on the sensitivity of the business tax base, Becker et al. (2012) on the effect of
the local tax on the activity of multinational enterprises, Foremny and Riedel (2014) for the effect
of elections on tax-rate changes, and Fuest et al. (2017) on the incidence of the local business tax
on wages.
4Our identification strategy, including the source of variation for the business-tax reforms and
reliance on event studies and generalized DiD, is similar to the recent study by Fuest et al. (2017).
This paper shows the existence of flat pre trends and provides several additional checks to support
the validity of the identification strategy.
5See Section 4 on the relationship between the tax-base elasticity and the tax-revenue elasticity.
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Among others, our elasticity estimates are not driven by municipalities with higher
property-tax rates than business-tax rates: municipalities which impose higher rates
on business profits than on property also face much more tax responsive business
profits than property.
The inverse-elasticity rule depicts that goods should be taxed in inverse pro-
portion to their price elasticities.6 We can combine this rule with our elasticity
estimates and conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations to determine the optimal
relation between the business and property tax rates. Given our elasticity estimates
of 0.117 for business-tax (putting aside the non-significance of this coefficient for
now) and 0.668 for property-tax revenues, such calculations yield that the property
tax rate should, from an inverse-elasticity perspective, nearly be six times higher on
average than the business tax rate. This is in contrast to actual rates; we observe
that throughout our sample period the business-tax multiplier is on average 1.08
times higher than the property-tax multiplier. This suggests that German munici-
palities are not compliant with the inverse-elasticity rule and leaves questions about
why local politicians deviate from it in practice.7
We use additional data sources to shed light on potential mechanisms that can
rationalize our findings that local taxation is not in line with the inverse-elasticity
rule. First, using a survey among local German politicians, we study beliefs of
policy makers about revenue elasticities. The majority of respondents in this survey
believes that an increase in business taxes will lead to (substantially) higher tax
revenues. This is somewhat in contrast to our findings and indicates that a lack
of knowledge about elasticities can explain why business is taxed relatively high.
We find that political ideology is a driver of the beliefs about revenue elasticities.
Second, we study if political economy arguments matter for tax-setting behavior.
Using the municipality data coupled with information about local election dates, we
show that the growth rate of both property and business tax rates is lower in years
of elections. This effect of elections is more pronounced for property taxes than for
business taxes, which is in line with the political-economy argument of maximizing
votes because home owners represent a larger group of voters than (incorporated)
6The inverse-elasticity rule is about minimizing deadweight loss in the presence of an exogenous
revenue requirement. Note that municipalities arguably do face such a revenue requirement. For
example, they are obligated by the federal level to finance large parts of child care and social
assistance to unemployed individuals. The inverse-elasticity rule is given by τ1η1 = τ2η2, where τ
and η are the tax rates and base elasticities of the two goods. See Section 4 for a formal argument
on the relationship between the tax-base and tax-revenue elasticity.
7It is important to note that we do not wish to suggest that our findings imply that local
taxation in Germany is inefficient with respect to overall welfare. We do not know the social
welfare function which politicians maximize (it could for example include distributional concerns).
As a result, we cannot infer any conclusions about welfare from our results. We only intend to
make statements about the consistency with the inverse-elasticity rule itself.
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business owners. Taken together, all this suggests that politicians use tax policy as
an instrument to stay in office.
Our paper speaks and contributes to three strands of literature. First, we relate
to a small literature that studies whether actual tax policy follows the requirements
of optimal-taxation theory.8 For example, Saez (2001) develops an optimal income
tax model that can be applied based on empirically estimated earnings elasticities.
Numerical simulations show that the pattern of actual tax schedules is close to the
U-shaped pattern of optimal tax rates that he derives based on his model. The
optimal top marginal tax rate, however, is higher than the actual top rate in the US
(Diamond and Saez 2011). Mankiw et al. (2009) discuss the extent to which the
most important lessons from the optimal-tax literature are consistent with actual
policies. They conclude that ”tax policy has moved in the directions suggested by
theory along a few dimensions, even though the recommendations of theory along
these dimensions are not always definitive.” (Mankiw et al. 2009, pages 147/148).
For example, they argue that the observed trend towards flatter income-tax rates in
OECD countries may suggest that tax-policy is affected by optimal-tax theory. The
paper mostly reports cross-country trends in taxation and does not provide a test
of optimal-tax rules based on empirically estimated elasticities. Creedy and Gemell
(2015) build on empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable income to show that,
for many individuals actual income-tax rates in the US are well in line with optimal
revenue-maximizing tax rates. As opposed to our paper, these few studies on the
optimality of actually implemented taxes are mostly on the personal income tax.
We provide some first evidence in this regard for other taxes.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the elasticity of the corporate tax
base and the elasticity of tax revenues. While the literature acknowledges that firms
respond to tax incentives and adjust to taxes along various different dimensions,9
only a few papers explicitly study the tax-sensitivity of the overall tax bases and
tax revenues. One reason for scarce evidence presumably is that in most countries,
corporate taxes are levied on the national or state level, which hinders the causal
identification of credible estimates. Comparisons of countries, and even federal
states within a country, are critical and common trend assumptions in country-
8According to Saez (2001), the optimal-tax literature mostly interests theorists and does not
make an impact on applications. This disconnect between the theoretic optimal-tax literature
and the applied-empirical literature may be among the reasons why actual tax policies are rarely
evaluated in the light of optimal-tax laws. Sørensen (2007) discusses the political relevance of the
theory of optimal taxation.
9For example, it has been shown that corporate tax policies affect location decisions (e.g.,
Devereux and Griffith 1998), investment behavior (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer 2011), financing
decisions (e.g., Graham 2003) or choice of organizational form (e.g., de Mooij and Nicodeme 2008).
Devereux et al. (2014) present a more detailed overview of this literature.
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level analyses over time are often hard to establish. We aim to overcome these
shortcomings by relying on the case of German local business and property taxes
in both an event-study and DiD research design with many independent tax-setting
municipalities which operate in a homogeneous economic environment.
There are a few papers that identify the effect of business/corporate taxes on
tax revenues or tax bases. Devereux et al. (2014) examine the elasticity of corporate
taxable income in the UK. Using kinks in the corporate tax schedule, the paper finds
moderate elasticities that differ depending on which kink is examined. Dwenger and
Steiner (2012) study a reform of the federal German corporate tax to estimate an
elasticity that is slightly larger than the ones in Devereux et al. (2014). In contrast
to these papers, our estimations are not based on a short time period or a single tax
reform but exploit various tax rate changes in a panel over many years.10
A few papers study the sensitivity of the business-tax base in the same insti-
tutional setting that we use. Buettner (2003) finds a very large effect on the tax
base, suggesting that the municipalities are on the downward-sloping part of the
business-tax Laffer curve. Baskaran (2015)11 does not find any significant effects
of the business tax on tax revenues; this is in line with our findings. These stud-
ies of Buettner (2003) and Baskaran (2015) are based on data from only one (out
of 16) federal states while we use country-wide data. Fossen and Steiner (2014)
use firm-level data to study how firms respond to changes in municipality-level tax
rates. Their findings suggest that firms reduce their taxable income by about 0.5%
in response to a 1% increase in the tax rate, suggesting that municipalities can raise
extra tax revenues through higher tax rates despite a significant tax-base response.
In contrast to the long panel we are able to rely on, Fossen and Steiner (2014) only
use data from two years which complicates standard common trend assumptions.
In general, our analysis intends to complement the few empirical papers, and adds
to the important understanding of behavioral responses of firms to profit taxation.
Third, our work adds to a very small literature on the sensitivity of property to
taxes. One recent study is Baskaran (2015), which uses the same institutional set-up
as we do, though only for one federal state, and finds that the tax-revenue elasticity
of property taxes is close to unity. Stine (1988) uses local-level panel data from
10Additional papers on the effect of corporate taxation on the tax base and revenues in non-
German countries include Gruber and Rauh (2007) who use accounting data that are subject to the
usual concerns with these type of data. Clausing (2007), Devereux (2007), and Brill and Hassett
(2007) employ country-level regressions but do not include country fixed effects, which makes the
results questionable. Mintz and Smart (2004) and Dahlby and Ferede (2012) use within-country
variation in Canada. Kawano and Slemrod (2015) study corporate-tax-base responses in a panel
of OECD countries.
11This paper focuses solely on the revenue elasticities of the local taxes, while we focus on the
implications of our revenue-elasticity estimates for the inverse-elasticity rule.
5
New York State and finds that the property tax base does not respond strongly to
tax-rate changes. The findings in both these studies are consistent with our findings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the institutional back-
ground. Section 3 describes the data sources and provides summary statistics. Sec-
tion 4 lays out our empirical approach and identification strategies and Section 5
presents the results. We discuss our findings and provide evidence on potential
mechanisms in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Institutional background
While most taxes are set at the federal level in Germany, German municipalities are
granted the right to set a business tax (Gewerbesteuer, short: BT) and a property
tax (Grundsteuer, short: PT) autonomously. This implies that the business and
property tax are set locally by each of more than 11,000 municipalities (Gemeinden)
that are spread around the entire country. Business and property tax revenue are two
of the most relevant sources of income of German municipalities.12 The business tax
is the most abundant tax on profits in Germany. Total (gross) business tax revenue
amounted to 43 billion EUR in 2013, this corresponds to about 7% of total national
tax revenues. Property tax income summed up to 12.4 billion EUR in 2013.
2.1 Business taxation
The business tax is levied on operating profits and applies to both corporate and
non-corporate firms.13 The tax base for the local business tax is legally defined by
the federal government and cannot be affected by the municipalities. The federal
government also sets a basic federal tax rate (Steuermesszahl, τBTfed ), but the local
municipalities choose the multiplier (Hebesatz, mBTi ). The actual business tax rate is
derived by multiplying the local tax multiplier with the basic federal tax rate.14 The
local tax rate τBTi on business profits in a municipality i equals: τ
BT
i = τ
BT
fed ×mBTi .
The basic federal tax rate, τBTfed , was set at 5% until 2007 and was decreased to
12Other major municipal income sources are the municipal shares of the VAT and the federal
income tax, duties and charges as well as municipal fiscal equalization transfers.
13In addition to the local business tax, corporate firms and non-corporate firms are also subject
to federal corporate and income taxes, respectively. Subject to certain restrictions, non-corporate
firms may deduct the local business tax from the federal income tax. Most companies in the
agricultural and public sector as well as self-employed and freelancers are exempted from the local
business tax.
14Strategic profit shifting of corporations with multiple establishments to exploit differences in
local business tax multipliers is illegal and very difficult given formula apportionment rules in
Germany.
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3.5% since 2008. That is, a multiplier mBTi of 300% implied a local business-tax
rate of 15% before 2008 and 10.5% since 2008.15 There are no kinks in the tax
schedule and the tax rate is not graduated so that marginal tax rates equal average
tax rates. With regard to the period of interest, two relevant reforms took place
in Germany on the federal level: First, the tax on business capital was abolished
in 1998, reducing the tax base of the business tax. Second, since 2008 the business
tax is no longer deductible as a business expense widening the tax base. These two
reforms affected all municipalities and firms in the country equally, and therefore
should not confound our results. Business tax multipliers varied between 30 and 600
during the time period 1995 to 2010 and averaged about 325.
Figure 3 in Section 6 provides an overview of the development of average
multipliers for both business and property tax rates over time. More summary
statistics can be found in Section 3.2.
2.2 Property taxation
The property tax works much in the same way as the business tax; the tax base
and the basic federal rate are defined at the federal level, and the municipalities
only decide upon the property-tax multiplier. The German property tax system
distinguishes two categories of property: property used for agricultural and forestry
(property tax A) and constructible property or property with buildings (property
tax B). In this paper, we focus on the latter, i.e. the property tax on buildings and
constructible property, because the tax on agricultural and forestry property is of
minor importance for a municipality’s tax revenue. The tax base is a standardized
value (Einheitswert) of the property (and not the market value).16 As with the
business tax, the property tax in a municipality i depends on the federal rate and
the multiplier, i.e., τPTi = τ
PT
fed×mPTi . The basic federal tax rate depends on the type
of building and also varies between West and East Germany. Depending on the type
of property, the rates vary between 0.26 and 0.35% in West Germany and between 0.5
and 1% in East Germany. The differences between East and West Germany account
for the different definitions of the standardized value (which is the tax base) in the
two parts of the country and are intended to make the multiplier rates comparable
15A minimum multiplier (floor) of 200% was implemented in 2004 to avoid detrimental tax
competition. However, only 18 out of more than 11,000 municipalities had set a multiplier below
200% before this reform.
16The standardized values do not fairly reflect today’s real property value (although they are
supposed to according to the legal basis). This is only one of the reasons why the reform of the
property tax is subject to frequent debate.
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between East and West Germany.17 Property tax multipliers varied between 50 and
810 during the time period 1995 to 2010 and averaged about 313.
2.3 Comparability of business and property tax rates
In evaluating whether German municipalities apply the inverse-elasticity-rule when
setting the multiplier tax rates for the property and business tax, we imply that
the multipliers are comparable between these two types of taxes. At first glance,
this seems to be a strong assumption because the tax bases appear to be very
different: operating profits of firms are the tax base in case of the business tax, and
standardized property values are the base for the property tax. However, we do not
compare the effective tax rates but rather use the multiplier rates for comparison.
These multiplier rates are not directly applied to the respective tax bases (prof-
its or property). Instead, the base is multiplied with the federal tax rate (”Steuer-
messzahl”) and then the multipliers are applied (recall: τi = τfed ×mi). We argue
that the substantially different levels of the federal tax rate (recall: between 3.5 and
5% for the business tax and between 0.26 and 1% for the property tax) account
for the different nature of the tax bases, and make the multiplier rates comparable
between the two types of taxes. This is supported by the levels of multipliers that
we observe. Although the tax bases are so different in nature, the multipliers for
both taxes range between very similar levels. During the time period that we exam-
ine, average multipliers ranged between 312 and 338 for the business tax and 292
and 329 for the property tax. Hence, the multipliers appear to be on similar and
comparable levels.18
An additional indication for our argument of comparable multipliers is that
fiscal equalization within Germany is based on multipliers. Note that fiscal equaliza-
tion payments are an important source of revenue of German municipalities. In fact,
state-specific reference multipliers – and not actual local multipliers – are applied to
calculate the fiscal capacity of a municipality, where this fiscal capacity determines
equalization payments (Arnold et al. 2015). State governments apply standardized
tax rates (Baskaran 2014), which are either set via reforms or as a weighted average
of all municipalities in that state in preceding years, for the definition of rule-based
grants to the municipal-level in order to alleviate tax rate competition. However,
17Since our data is on the municipality level, we do not have information on the distribution of
property types, hence do not know the respective federal tax rates. This is one reason why we use
the multipliers rather than the effective tax rates in our empirical analyses.
18The view that the federal rates are adjusted to make the tax multipliers comparable is sup-
ported by the fact that the federal rates for the property tax are different for East and West
Germany due to different definitions of the standardized property values.
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state reference rates are very similar or often the same for local business tax and
property tax rates (Landkreistag 2017). Therefore, state-wide standardization of
tax policy likely leads to a harmonization of tax rates within state and substantially
contributes to the comparability of the local business and property tax.
A further approach to compare the tax rates of the two tax instruments is to
account for the different types of tax bases and estimate the tax rate on ’profits’
that are implied (see section 6 for a detailed explanation).
3 Data
This section provides an overview of our data, summary statistics and outlines the
identifying variation in both types of tax rates that we use in our empirical analysis.
3.1 Data sources
We construct a unique data set on German municipalities using and combining
different sources of administrative data. Our municipality-level data on tax rates,
tax revenues and population come from the statistical offices of the federal states.19
Municipality-level employment statistics are provided by the Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit). We further add variables on the county-level
(GDP, level of debt, disposable income of private households) for the years 1995-
2010, which come from a different data source at the statistical offices of the federal
states. Note that each of about 400 counties either comprises several municipalities
or constitutes a single municipality.
Due to data restrictions, we gather our sample from the years 1995-2010 as
most federal states do not provide data earlier than the 1990s. In addition, the
county-level variables are as well only available since 1995. This is the reason why
we base our baseline estimations on the period 1995-2010. We also run sensitivity
checks with a longer time-series but fewer federal-states (not reported). To obtain
comparable elasticity measures, we restrict our empirical analysis to those munici-
palities for which we have complete information on the business-tax and property-
tax rates and revenues. We further exclude municipalities with negative business
or property tax revenue in a certain year from our empirical analysis since actual
19The most recent data, since 2009, are available online at the so-called Regional Database
Germany (Regionaldatenbank). Data for the years between 2001 and 2008 are made available on
DVDs (called Statistik Lokal) that can be purchased directly from the federal statistical office.
Earlier data before 2001 are retrieved on request directly from the respective statistical offices of
the federal states. This is the reason why the time dimension of our data set varies by state. For
example, while our oldest data on the PT and BT go back to the 1970s (Bavaria), Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern could only provide data since 1998. Results are robust to longer panel data.
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revenues cannot be negative but are only reported to be negative due to account-
ing procedures. In total, the data in our baseline analysis contain about 170,000
municipality-level observations in the 16-year panel, 1995-2010 (see Table A.1 in the
Appendix for more information). The next section provides summary statistics.
3.2 Summary statistics and identifying variation
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our baseline sample during the period
1995 to 2010. Average tax revenue from the business tax (BT) is much higher than
from the property tax (PT), suggesting that the business tax is more important for
the municipalities. The table also shows that there is great heterogeneity across
municipalities w.r.t. to population size (between 10 and 3.5 million inhabitants).
The fact that the average BT multiplier is higher than the average PT multiplier is
at the center of this paper, and will be discussed in more detail below.
Table 1: Summary statistics, 1995-2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Revenue BT (1,000 EUR) 2651.616 28204.096 0.005 2078955 174670
Revenue BT (log 1,000 EUR) 4.91 2.501 -5.276 14.547 174670
Multiplier BT (%) 324.885 37.755 30 600 174670
Multiplier BT (log %) 5.776 0.121 3.401 6.397 174670
Revenue PT (1,000 EUR) 808.975 8033.088 0.511 747238 174670
Revenue PT (log 1,000 EUR) 4.799 1.694 -0.671 13.524 174670
Multiplier PT (%) 313.119 45.87 50 810 174670
Multiplier PT(log %) 5.736 0.146 3.912 6.697 174670
GDP (1,000 EUR) 3773758.17 3354230.616 671848 98751797 158540
Population (1,000) 7.183 46.607 0.01 3471.418 174418
Population (sq 1,000) 2223.819 117169.293 0 12050743 174418
Debt (1,000 EUR) 157390.836 119370.435 0 3414334 162730
Private income (1,000 EUR) 2845050.66 1934041.044 488465 31811513 150270
Employees 2549.232 18909.947 0 1158925 158700
Notes: Summary statistics. Municipal level variables: BT and PT revenue and multiplier, popula-
tion and number of employees. County level variables: level of debt, income of private households
and GDP. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities collected from the statis-
tical offices of the German federal states. Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which
information on BT and PT were available. Observations excluded if revenue is reported negative.
Our identification strategy rests on within-municipality variation in tax rates
over time. Table 2 provides an overview of variation in the business-tax and property-
tax multipliers. For each year of our baseline sample, it depicts the share of munic-
ipalities which change their BT and PT rates in year t compared to year t− 1. On
average, 8% and 10% of the municipalities change their BT and PT multipliers per
10
year, respectively. Thereby, the BT tends to be more stable than the PT and the
share of municipalities that changed the PT is higher each year.
Table 2: Share of municipalities with changing BT and PT multipliers (in %)
Year Change BT Change PT
1995 14.40 18.97
1996 8.45 10.60
1997 8.83 12.94
1998 8.96 12.40
1999 4.63 6.25
2000 5.02 5.95
2001 8.01 8.30
2002 7.96 9.97
2003 9.69 13.35
2004 8.81 13.26
2005 11.12 14.98
2006 8.20 9.98
2007 4.50 5.70
2008 4.29 5.00
2009 4.84 5.07
2010 9.79 12.88
Total 7.82 10.14
Notes: Share of municipalities which change their business tax (BT) and property tax (PT) mul-
tipliers between years.
Figure 1 shows the size distribution of tax rate changes for the business and
property tax, respectively. It becomes apparent that there are more tax rate in-
creases than decreases for both tax types and only a small share of municipalities
implement multiplier changes that exceed 50 percentage points. The mean change
for business tax and property tax rates is about 1.28 and 2.33 percentage points,
respectively. Altogether, we observe 26,393 tax reforms in our sample period for
both the business tax and property tax. The business and property tax accounts
for 11,496 and 14,897 changes, respectively.
Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix provide further detailed information on
the size and direction of the changes that we exploit for identifying variation. Most
of the changes are in the range between 1 and 50 percentage points.20
20The spatial variation of tax rate choices over time is visualized in Appendix Figures A.1 and
A.2. The figures depict maps of Germany showing the levels of business taxes and property taxes
in 2001 and 2010, respectively.
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Figure 1: Size of tax rate changes of Business and Property tax
Notes: Frequency distribution of the size of yearly tax rate changes in 1995-2010 for business
(green) and property (white) tax rates in percentage points, respectively. The plot only considers
actual tax rate changes, i.e. the yearly difference is not equal to zero. Hence, the plot considers
11,496 business and 14,897 property tax reforms in the sample period. For illustrative purposes
we omit the lowest and highest percentile of tax rate change sizes for the business and property
tax, respectively.
4 Empirical strategy and identification
We use two different empirical strategies to estimate the effect of local business
and property tax rates on their respective tax revenues. First, we use an event-
study design which allows us to show the dynamics of local tax reforms on the
respective revenues and to provide an illustration of common pre-trends in revenue
outcomes before tax reforms; i.e. studying if there are no significant revenue effects
preceding a tax rate reform. Second, we estimate the average treatment effects of
tax rate changes for both types of taxation in a generalized DiD model. While
the DiD specifications give us the magnitude of revenue changes triggered by local
tax reforms, we can establish the absence of diverging pre-trends using event-study-
type estimations. In general, our empirical design is very similar to the empirical
set up in Fuest et al. (2017). They also use local taxation in German municipalities
for identifying variation and employ both event studies and DiD. However, they
focus on the tax effects on wages – while we look at revenues – and focus solely on
business-tax rates – while we study variation in both business and property taxes.21
Our outcome variables throughout are tax revenues from either the business
21Fuest et al. (2017) provide extensive checks to validate the identifying assumptions behind the
empirical approach.
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or property tax rate in a given municipality and year. We denote these outcomes as
Y ji,t, where i and t indicate the municipality and year, and j indicates the respective
tax type: either business tax (BT) or property tax (PT).
Event-study. We start out by estimating the following event-study regression:
log Y ji,t =
4∑
w=−4
γjwD
j,w
i,t + β
j
1Xi,t−1 + β
j
2Zc,t−1 + λi + φt + φt × ηs + µji,t. (1)
Dummy variables Dj,w indicate an event for tax type j that happens w pe-
riods away from t. Our effects of interest are the coefficients γjw for each of these
dummy variables. Following Fuest et al. (2017), we study three types of ’events’ for
identifying variation: (i) large tax hikes, (ii) all tax hikes and (iii) all tax rate reduc-
tions. In regressions with business-tax revenues as outcome variable, the respective
events are defined based on reforms of the business-tax rate. Accordingly, events are
based on property-tax reforms when property-tax revenues constitute the outcome
variable. We define large hikes as any yearly tax-rate increases which exceed the
75th percentile of all tax increases of tax j in year t. Figure A.3 of the Appendix
gives the number of reform events by type for the business tax and property tax,
respectively. We observe a fairly large number of about 2800 ’large’ increases for
business taxes and about 4400 ’large’ increases for property tax rates.22 The number
of tax decreases is relatively small with 1219 and 812 related tax rate changes, re-
spectively. Distinguishing these events allows us to estimate the respective revenue
effect of different types of events; this is advantageous because large reforms might
have different effects than small reforms (e.g., due to adjustment costs).
We estimate the event-study with an event window running from 4 years prior
to a reform up to 4 years after the reform. The event-type model allows thus to
check for potentially diverging pre-trends in the 4 years prior to the tax reform and
to estimate lagged revenue effects in the 4 years after the event. These dynamics
are important: the pre-trends lend credibility to our identification and the dynamics
post reform shed light on lagged effects of tax reforms. Note that our results are
robust to using longer or shorter event windows.23 In line with the literature, we bin
up event dummies at the end points of the event window. So the dummies Dj,4i,t and
Dj,−4i,t account for all events four or more years away from the event. This is necessary
because reform years differ across municipalities. Because of this procedure, we do
22Large hikes for business (property) tax amount to 28.57 (32.67) percentage points on average.
23See Appendix C for graphical illustrations of the 5-5 and 3-3 year event window specifications.
13
not plot the endpoint estimates in our event-study graphs.
Following examples in the literature (Fuest et al. 2017; Simon 2016), we impose
the following sample restrictions to implement the event studies. First, we exclude
municipalities that implemented another type of event during the sample period.
More specifically, when considering tax hikes (either large or all tax hikes) we exclude
municipalities that implemented decreases during the sample period. Accordingly,
we exclude municipalities with increases when considering tax reductions (and vice
versa). This eliminates the risk that other types of reforms confound our effects
of interest. Second, we balance the sample by dropping observations for which we
do not observe the entire event window around a given tax reform. That is, for
example, a 1997 reform is not considered because 1993 (i.e., four years before the
reform) is not in our sample. Third, we use a balanced sample where we only
include municipalities that are included in each year of the sample period. Some
East German municipalities were merged during the sample period, making the raw
panel unbalanced. However, our event-study set up requires balanced data.
We add municipality fixed effects (λi), year fixed effects (φt) as well as federal-
state specific year effects (φt × ηs) to the regressions – the latter set of fixed effects
particularly accounts for regional shocks. We also include several (lagged) control
variables to account for time-varying and pre-determined local shocks to municipal
budgets. First, we control for time-varying factors Xi,t on the level of municipality i
which include population (in levels and squares) and the total number of employees.
Second, we further account for potential confounders Zc,t on the county-level c such
as GDP, level of debt as well as disposable income of private households. µi,t is our
error term.24 Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level which is the
aggregation level of the identifying variation.
Differences-in-differences. While our event-study design mainly serves the pur-
pose of establishing flat pre-trends (see Section 5 below) and checking the dynamics
of the effects, we use a generalized DiD model to estimate the average treatment
effects of tax rate changes on tax revenues. This model formally reads:
log Y ji,t = 
j logmji,t−1 + β
j
1Xi,t−1 + β
j
2Zc,t−1 + λi + φt + φt × ηs + µji,t. (2)
Again, the dependent variable, Y ji,t, is tax revenue (in EUR) generated from
24We also control for a full set of event dummys indicating tax hikes and reductions in the event
window for the property tax (business tax) when analyzing the effects of the business tax (property
tax). This is to avoid that our business tax (property tax) estimates are driven by simultaneous
changes in property taxes (business taxes).
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the tax of type j (either business or property) in municipality i. The explanatory
variable of interest is the lagged (business or property) tax multiplier mji,t−1. Note
that the generalized DiD model includes a full set of lagged control variables on
the municipal (Xi,t−1: population in levels and squares and the total number of
employees) and county level (Zc,t−1: GDP, level of debt as well as disposable income
of private households); these are the same control variables that are included in the
event studies above. We also add municipality (λi), year (φt) and state-year (φt×ηs)
fixed effects. Tax revenues and tax rates enter the regression in logs to derive an
elasticity interpretation of the effect of tax rates on revenues. The elasticity of
interest for tax of type j is denoted j.
Identification. Each of the about 11,000 municipalities annually sets the tax rate
multiplier for year t in the last months of year t−1, and our data cover the universe
of all municipalities and span a long time period (see Section 3.2 for details on the
variation in tax rates). This institutional set up generates many differential tax rate
changes, motivating the use of event-studies and generalized DiD.
The identifying assumption is that municipalities with tax rate changes would
have had the same development of tax revenues as municipalities without tax rate
changes, had they not implemented a tax rate change.
This assumption is violated if, for example, local economic conditions force
certain municipalities to change rates, whereas other municipalities face other, less
pressing local economic conditions. We take two steps to alleviate this possible
threat to identification (as in Fuest et al. 2017): First, we include federal-state
(Laender) specific year effects that control for any economic shocks on the federal-
state level. Since federal states constitute homogeneous economic environments, it
is unlikely that a certain economic shock hits municipalities within a federal state
differently. Second, in addition to wiping out time-invariant municipality effects, we
control for time-varying municipality characteristics such as size as well as economic
conditions such as GDP, level of debt or number of employees. This implies that we
only compare municipalities with similar characteristics and economic conditions.
In addition, previous evidence shows that tax changes are usually implemented for
political, rather than economic, reasons (such as upcoming elections), suggesting
that local economic conditions play a minor role in explaining tax changes (see e.g.,
Castanheira et al. 2012; Foremny and Riedel 2014; Fuest et al. 2017).25
25Some of the covariates that we include to control for economic conditions might be endogenous
to tax-rate changes. To account for this, we throughout present regression specifications without
covariates. There might be additional factors which are omitted from the regression due to data
restrictions, for example environmental regulation. However, the resulting bias is arguably small,
if at all existing, because most environmental regulations are set on the federal or state level and
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Our event-studies serve the prime purpose of testing if municipalities imple-
menting a reform have different developments of tax-revenue prior to the reform.
Since tax revenues are a good indicator of local economic conditions, the flat pre-
trends that we establish below alleviate identification concerns. Furthermore, Fuest
et al. (2017), who use the same variation in business taxes that we use, provide care-
ful tests showing that local economic conditions such as GDP and unemployment
do not drive tax changes.
One other concern with many empirical tax studies is that tax reforms often
come with changes in tax rates and tax base definitions (e.g., tax-rate-cut-cum-base-
broadening type reforms). Kawano and Slemrod (2015) provide empirical evidence
that tax changes are usually accompanied by tax-base changes. This is not a concern
in our set-up: any changes in tax base definitions are legislated on the federal level
and are accounted for by the year fixed effects. Reverse causality is not likely to
bias our results either. The timing of events is such that municipalities usually set
the multiplier in the last months of year t − 1; that is, before they are aware of
tax revenues in year t. Reverse causality, however, remains a potential problem if
municipalities have precise expectations in t − 1 regarding tax revenue in year t.
We apply two procedures in order to deal with this claim. First, our event-study
design allows us to establish flat pre-trends which indicate that tax reforms are not
driven by tax-revenue considerations. Second, we use lagged tax rate multipliers in
the DiD setting to alleviate concerns of reverse causality. We also introduce several
time-varying control variables which are lagged by one year to address this issue.
A further identification concern relates to tax competition effects and the po-
tential dependency of tax policies across neighboring municipalities.26 Recent em-
pirical evidence using the same institutional set-up as ours by Baskaran (2014),
however, does not find any sort of tax mimicking and therefore neglects this pos-
sible source of bias. His paper shows that following an exogenous tax reform that
provided municipalities in one federal state with an incentive to change rates, neigh-
boring municipalities in other federal states did not adjust their rates in response.27
In general, the empirical set-up is advantageous in light of the purpose of this
paper: we aim to compare tax responses of two different taxable goods. We do
this looking at the same municipalities over the same time period using the exact
therefore accounted for in the time and regional-specific time fixed effects.
26We abstain from including neighborhood measures of local tax rates such as spatial lags in
our baseline as they might be endogenous to the tax rate of the municipality under consideration,
representing a bad control in the spirit of Angrist and Pischke (2009). Controlling for county
averages of local tax rates (except the respective tax rate of town i) does, however, not change our
results, respectively.
27Lyytika¨inen (2012) finds similar results for property taxes in Finland. Moreover, Isen (2014)
shows that there are no local spillovers of sales, bond, property or income taxes in the US.
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same identification strategies and data. If any sources of endogeneity remain despite
our research design, the resulting bias will be similar for the property and business
tax elasticities, hence ensuring that the relative magnitudes of the estimates are
comparable.
Tax-base vs tax-revenue elasticities. The inverse-elasticity rule is regarding
the responsiveness of tax bases, rather than the responsiveness of tax revenues.
However, data restrictions do not allow us to study the effect of taxes on tax bases
and we instead estimate the effect on tax revenues (see footnote 2 and Section 2.2).
To see the relationship between the tax-base elasticity and the tax-revenue elasticity,
consider the simple inverse-elasticity rule:
τ1η1 = τ2η2, (3)
where τj and ηj (with j ∈ 1, 2) are the tax rate and the tax-base elasticity of goods 1
and 2 (i.e., property and business profits), respectively. The tax base is denoted Bj
and the term for the tax-base elasticity is: ηj =
∆Bj
∆τj
τj
Bj
. Tax revenue TRj is given
by TRj = τjBj, and changes in tax revenue are then:
∆TRj = ∆τjBj + τj∆Bj = ∆τjBj + ηjBj∆τj = Bj(1 + ηj)∆τj (4)
To derive the elasticity of tax revenue, we divide the above equation by TRj = τjBj
and rearrange the equation:
∆TRj
∆τj
τj
TRj
= (1 + ηj) (5)
The left-hand-side in this equation is the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to
the tax rate, which is the parameter that we identify from our empirical estimates
(denoted j in the regression equation above). The equation shows that our empirical
estimate equals (1 + ηj), and hence has a direct relationship with the elasticity of
the tax base. In particular, a high elasticity of tax revenues is associated with a low
(in absolute terms) elasticity of the tax base, and vice versa. In the extreme case
where our revenue elasticity would be estimated to be 1 (0), the associated tax-base
elasticity is 0 (-1). Note that we expect the tax-revenue elasticity to be positive and
the tax-base elasticity to be negative. This exercise of course neglects the role of
deductions and credits, but shows the general relation between the elasticities of the
tax base and tax revenue.
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5 Results
5.1 Event-study design
We first present our results on tax revenue effects of local tax reforms using our
event-study design from equation (1) for property and business tax rate changes in
Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 2, respectively. As usual with event studies, we present
the results in event-study graphs that plot the coefficients. The dummies indicating
the year before the reform are always omitted so that all effects are relative to the
year before an event. The full regression results of the baseline scenario with an
event window of 4 years prior to and after individual tax reform events are also
shown in Table C.1 in the Appendix. As described before, we show the revenue
effects for three types of tax reforms, each for both types of taxes: large tax hikes
only, any tax rate increases and any decreases.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the significant and substantial revenue effects from
changes in property tax rates. We find positive and highly significant revenue effects
from property tax increases which materialize immediately and remain substantial
over time. Corresponding with intuition, larger tax rate increases yield somewhat
higher tax revenues than all increases on average. We further observe that tax
decreases result in immediate negative and significant drops in tax revenues.
Most importantly, the graphs show very flat revenue trends preceding the
reforms; neither type of property-tax reform is determined by significant tax revenue
trends before the reform events.28
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the equivalent event-study graphs for the effect of
business-tax rates on business-tax revenues. We again observe flat pre-event trends,
meaning that there are no significant revenue effects for the years before the reform.29
Considering the effects of ’Large hikes’, we mostly do not see any significant post-
event effects. We observe slightly significant post-event effects when we consider
tax hikes of all sizes. However, the point-estimates are not very large. Note that
for both taxes, decreases in tax rates are relatively rare and accordingly, estimates
are relatively noisy. Overall, the event-study results show larger and more precise
revenue effects of property-tax reforms relative to the revenue effects of business-tax
reforms; compare Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.
28This is true although Table C.1 of the Appendix indicates that property tax increases in the
specification ’Hike’ show some significance for the tax hike coefficients 3 years before the reform.
However, the point estimate is very small and the significance vanishes two years prior to the
reform.
29The only pre-event significance that we see is for the F3 coefficient in the ’Hike’ specification.
However, this significance is only on the 10% level and the point estimate is comparable to the
non-significant point estimate in the ’Large Hike’ specification.
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Figure 2: Event-study graphs: Baseline estimates
Notes: Panel (a) plots event study estimates for property tax rate reforms on the log property tax
revenues. Panel (b) illustrates the related findings for the business tax. Both panels show event-
study estimates (γj ; j[−3; +3]), i.e. without window ends, for the baseline scenario of a 4 to 4 year
event window and the corresponding 90% (vertical line) and 95% confidence bands (horizontal line)
for different reform types of equation 1. Event variables are dummies equal to one for a tax increase,
a large tax increase (greater than or equal to the 75th percentile of the tax increase distribution),
or a tax decrease (see legend). In specifications with tax increase (decrease) dummies, we exclude
all municipalities that experienced a tax decrease (increase) during the observation period. We
also balance our event-study such that only tax reforms are included that are observed throughout
the whole event window, here 4 years before and after the reform.
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Figure C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix shows that our results are robust to
longer or shorter event windows, i.e. including lead and lag dummies for both
either 5 or 3 years before and after reform events. Changes in both the property
and the business tax rates yield strikingly similar results to the findings in our
baseline scenario: Property tax increases lead to significant increases from property
tax revenues while business tax rate changes mostly do not yield significant revenue
changes. Importantly, we also do not find significantly diverging pre-trends of tax
revenue outcomes in the years preceding reform events for the business and property
tax, respectively.
5.2 Differences-in-Differences
Main results. While our event-study design establishes flat pre-trends, we es-
timate the magnitude of the average treatment effects of tax rate changes on tax
revenues in a generalized DiD setting.
Table 3 depicts our main regression results, estimated using equation (2).
Columns (I) and (II) show that business-tax rate changes do not significantly affect
business-tax revenues. This indicates that business profits respond very elastic to
tax-rate changes. The elasticity of tax revenues with respect to a (lagged) change
in the tax multiplier is about 0.12 and not statistically different from zero. That is,
municipalities are not able to raise significant amounts of extra tax revenue by in-
creasing business tax rates. The results are robust to the control variables included
(columns (I) vs. (II)). Our elasticity estimates suggest that, because firms are tax
responsive, tax rates in German municipalities are placed close to the peak of the
Laffer curve. While these elasticities appear to be very low, they are still higher
than the results in Buettner (2003) who finds that municipalities in the federal state
of Baden-Wuerttemberg even loose tax revenue in response to tax-rate hikes.
Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 3 present the results for the property-tax elas-
ticities. We find that, in contrast to business income, property is substantially less
responsive to tax-rate changes. This confirms the findings from our event-study pro-
cedure in the previous section. A 1% increase in the (lagged) property-tax multiplier
leads to a tax-revenue increase of about 0.67%. The results are practically indepen-
dent of the control variables we include (columns (III) vs. (IV)). The property tax
elasticities are in line with intuition: physical property cannot be as mobile as busi-
ness income and only responds slightly through, for example, long-term responses or
avoidance/evasion channels. It may also be that building activities in non-affected
municipalities grow quicker relative to those with property-tax changes. Recall that
the event-study estimates in the previous section illustrated that the additional
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(foregone) property tax revenues from tax decrease (increase) slightly over time (see
Table C.1 in the Appendix). The result that property becomes more mobile in the
long-run is in line with the findings of Stine (1988). In light of the fact that we esti-
mate property-tax and business-tax elasticities in the exact same institutional set-up
using an identical research design, the plausibility of the property-tax estimates also
lends credibility to our estimates for the business-tax elasticities.
Table 3: Effects of business and property taxes on tax revenues
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Revenue business tax Revenue property tax
mBTt−1 0.081 0.117
(0.096) (0.090)
mPTt−1 0.653∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
State × Year FE yes yes yes yes
Controls no yes no yes
N 152,770 130,814 152,770 130,814
R2 0.150 0.153 0.588 0.668
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on equation ((2)) with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗
< 0.01. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years 1995 to 2010.
The unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable in columns (I) and (II) is
municipality-level tax revenue generated from the local business tax (BT), and municipality-level
tax revenue from the local property tax (PT) in columns (III) and (IV). The independent vari-
able of interest is the municipality-level tax multiplier m in t − 1 for the business or property
tax. Reported coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms. All spec-
ifications include year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and federal-state specific year fixed
effects. Columns (I) and (III) do not include controls. Columns (II) and (IV) add lagged controls
for population, local GDP, level of debt, number of employees, and disposable income of private
households.
Robustness checks. Our results are robust to a number of further sensitivity
checks presented in Table B.1 in the Appendix. Panel A of the table depicts the
results of regressions estimated on a balanced panel of municipalities. The results
are almost unchanged. In Panel B, we present regressions which account for the
fact that business and property tax rates are often jointly reformed and we drop all
related observations to evaluate business and property tax reforms separately. The
effects remain the same in magnitude and statistical significance.
Moreover, in Table B.2 in the Appendix we run additional sensitivity checks
to examine whether our results are driven by modeling choice or the inclusion of
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further controls. All DiD baseline estimations include municipality, year as well
as state-specific year fixed effects. Model (I) of Table B.2 includes district-specific
time trends to aggregate for common economic shocks instead of state-specific year
fixed effects but results do not change. Model (II) adds the state-specific year fixed
effects and Model (III) includes socio-economic control variables on the town and
county-level from our baseline. Again, for both taxes revenue elasticities remain
unchanged. We also account for potential omitted variables by including different
factors of relevance, i.e. spatial lags of tax rates (Model (IV)) or quadratic terms to
account for non-linearities of tax rate effects on the respective tax revenues (Model
(V)).
Model (IV) includes spatial lags, i.e. that is the lagged average tax rate of
all other municipalities in a given district (excluding the tax rate of municipality
i), for the business tax or property tax rate in our baseline regression, respectively.
Doing this, we want to account for potential spatial confounders in local tax policies
which could affect the estimates of our tax revenue elasticities. Even though the
coefficient of average tax rates in the county neighborhood appear to be partially
significant (for the business tax, unreported), including spatial dependency does
not invalidate our baseline findings and our results remain unchanged. Model (V),
however, includes a quadratic term of the lagged log tax rate for the business tax
or property tax rate, respectively. Non-linear effects of tax rates on related tax
revenues might be plausible in a Laffer curve framework of U-shaped tax revenue-
tax rate relationship. The estimations for the business tax show both insignificant
linear and non-linear terms of the tax rate coefficient which may be indicative that
German municipalities are at the peak of the Laffer curve. The property tax rate,
however, is likely to be at the upward-sloping path of the Laffer curve as higher
tax rates yield significantly higher property tax revenues but at an decreasing rate.
Hence, German municipalities could indeed increase their property tax rates in order
to gain more revenues.
Table B.3 of the Appendix also investigates whether different clustering leads
to changes in inference of our baseline estimates. In our baseline estimations we
cluster at the municipal level to avoid bias from serial correlation. Table B.3 shows
that standard errors hardly change when we conduct clustering of standard errors
at higher levels of aggregation such as counties, states or year-specific interactions
of these aggregations as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Finally, we also examine if differences in elasticities are associated with differ-
ent tax rates. Table 4 reports regression results separately for municipalities that
have higher property-tax rates than business-tax rates (Panel A) and municipalities
that impose a higher rate on business profits than on property (Panel B). Reassur-
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ingly, the coefficients in both panels reveal the same pattern as before for both types
of municipalities, i.e. property-tax revenues are always far more responsive to tax
rate changes than business-tax revenues – this holds even in those municipalities
that impose higher taxes on business than on property.
Table 4: Tax-revenue elasticities. Heterogeneity w.r.t. tax-rate relation
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Revenue business tax Revenue property tax
Panel A: Municipalities with mBT <= mPT
mBTt−1 0.079 0.117
(0.125) (0.123)
mPTt−1 0.658∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.023)
N 67,697 51,940 67,697 51,940
R2 0.166 0.167 0.441 0.478
Panel B: Municipalities with mBT > mPT
mBTt−1 0.158 0.280∗
(0.154) (0.154)
mPTt−1 0.661∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
N 85,073 78,874 85,073 78,874
R2 0.124 0.134 0.694 0.742
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on equation ((2)) with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗
< 0.01. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years 1995 to 2010.
The unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable in columns (I) and (II) is
municipality-level tax revenue generated from the local business tax (BT), and municipality-level
tax revenue from the local property tax (PT) in columns (III) and (IV). The independent vari-
able of interest is the municipality-level tax multiplier m in t − 1 for the business or property
tax. Reported coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms. All spec-
ifications include year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and federal-state specific year fixed
effects. Columns (I) and (III) do not include controls. Columns (II) and (IV) add lagged controls
for population, local GDP, level of debt, number of employees, and disposable income of private
households. Note that Panel A (B) is restricted to municipalities whose business-tax multiplier is
smaller (greater) than the respective property-tax multiplier.
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6 Discussion of results
6.1 Comparing implemented business-tax and property-tax
rates in light of relative tax elasticities
Our empirical findings are consistent across all DiD specifications: property-tax rev-
enue responds significantly to tax-rate changes whereas business-tax revenue does
not.30 These results imply that the property-tax base is significantly less respon-
sive than the business-tax base. Following the simple inverse-elasticity rule, this
would suggest that average property taxes should be considerably higher than av-
erage business taxes. However, this is not what we observe in the data. Figure 3
depicts the evolution of the (unweighted) average business-tax multiplier and the
(unweighted) average property-tax multiplier over time. The figure clearly shows
that property-tax multipliers are lower than business-tax multipliers throughout
our entire sample period. While the difference becomes slightly smaller over time,
it has been considerably large and stable since the early 2000s.
Table A.4 in the Appendix presents more evidence in this regard. For each
year between 1995 and 2010, it displays the share of municipalities which have a
higher business-tax multiplier than property-tax multiplier. On average, 54% of all
municipalities taxed business profits higher than property, and this share was larger
than 50% in all years except 1999 and 2000. Our results show that our main elasticity
estimates are not driven by those municipalities with higher property-tax rates than
business-tax rates: the business-tax elasticities are smaller even in municipalities
which set higher taxes on business profits relative to those with higher property-tax
rates (see Table 4).
Another perspective on comparing the tax rates of the two tax instruments
is to account for the different tax bases and estimate the average tax rate on the
implied ’profits’ of business and property. Estimating the tax rate on business profits
is simple. Recall that the BT tax rate is calculated by τBTi = τ
BT
fed ×mBTi . Plugging
in the federal rate of 3.5% and the mean LBT multiplier of 325% implies that the
average local tax rate on business profits is 11.34%.
Calculating the average tax on ’profits’ from the property tax is slightly more
complex. We aim to estimate the average real return to a property investment.
We take the following approach: The mean PT multiplier is 313% and the federal
30It would be interesting to study how tax bases decline in response to higher taxes. This question
is beyond the scope of our paper, but there is some first evidence in the literature with respect
to business taxes: Berger et al. (2016) and Becker et al. (2012) find that incorporated firms and
multinational headquarters in Germany are sensitive to local business-tax changes, respectively.
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rate (for West Germany) is 0.35%.31 Recall that the tax base of the PT is the
so-called standardized value of a property (Einheitswert) which is based on historic
property values as of 1964. In order to derive the PT rate on current market values
of the property, information about the ratio of the 1964 values and current market
values are necessary. Based on information from the German Ministry of Finance,
Jorda et al. (2017) state that in 2010 the standardized values were 5% of market
values (which reflects the strong increase in housing values since 1964). As a result,
the average PT rate on current property market values is: 0.055% (= 0.0035 ×
0.05×3.13). The average net real return to housing in Germany is 4.12%, according
to Jorda et al. (2017). This then implies that the annual return to a property
investment is taxed through the PT with a rate of only 1.335% (= 0.00055/0.0412).
This back-of-the-envelope calculation is a further piece of evidence pointing
in the direction that business profits are taxed higher than property ’profits’. This
finding of higher BT rates is robust to the choice of the parameters in the calculation;
in particular, the finding holds even for alternative plausible numbers for the annual
return on property investments.32
Figure 3: Average BT and PT multipliers over time
Notes: The Figure depicts the evolution of business-tax and property-tax multipliers over time.
Unweighted country-wide averages for the years 1995-2010 based on municipality-level data.
Given our empirical elasticity findings, the descriptive observation that busi-
31The West-German federal rates depend on the type of property and vary between 0.26% and
0.35%. We use 0.35% in our calculations as it is the most common rate. This approach hence gives
us an upper bound for the tax rate. The East German rates are between 0.5 and 1%.
32Using the highest federal rate of 1% for East Germany would not change the picture either.
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ness profits are taxed at higher rates than property stands in contrast with the
inverse-elasticity rule, which depicts that goods should be taxed in inverse propor-
tion to their tax sensitivity. Considering the simplest version of this theoretical
insight,33 our baseline revenue-elasticity estimates of 0.117 for business-tax revenues
and 0.668 for property-tax revenues would imply that the multiplier on property
should be nearly six times higher than the multiplier on business profits. This ratio
is very high and likely not feasible in practice, but it reveals that in this set-up,
taxing business profits at higher rates than property is not in line with one of the
basic insights of the inverse-elasticity rule. As opposed to a ratio that would be
in line with this rule, we observe that in reality throughout our sample period the
business-tax multiplier is on average 1.08-times higher than the property tax mul-
tiplier. In support of the claim that municipalities do not set tax rates in line with
inverse-elasticity-rule ideas, we find that even those municipalities that set higher
business-tax rates face highly tax-responsive business-tax bases and non-responsive
property tax-bases.
6.2 Evidence on possible explanations
We have established two findings using our two-step strategy. First, the business-tax
base is more mobile than the property-tax base in German municipalities. Second,
business-tax rates are on average higher than property tax rates. In light of the first
finding, this suggests that policy makers in German municipalities do not tax in ac-
cordance with the inverse-elasticity rule. The natural question that arises is: why do
we find that policy-makers in German municipalities do not set tax rates according
to the inverse-elasticity-rule? Several explanations come to mind that might help to
rationalize our finding. This section sheds light on two possible explanations.
First, policy makers in German municipalities may have a wrong perception
of the revenue effects of tax-rate changes. That is, they lack knowledge of the
underlying tax-revenue elasticities (which we estimated empirically). As a result,
they do not realize that it may be more efficient to tax property than business.
For instance, their perceptions of the relevant elasticities depend on their political
ideology. Second, tax policy might be based on political-economy arguments where
politicians seek to stay in office and maximize votes. The following two subsections
provide empirical evidence on both of these mechanisms on local tax policy.34
33Note that the inverse-elasticity rule reads τ1η1 = τ2η2, where our estimated tax-revenue elas-
ticities equal (1 + ηj), with ηj being the elasticity of the tax base (see Section 4).
34Note that, this is, of course, not an exhaustive list of potential explanations. However, we
focus on these two since they i) appear to be potentially very relevant to us and ii) we gained
access to data that allow us to study these explanations. Other explanations include, for instance,
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6.2.1 Politicians’ beliefs about revenue elasticities
Politicians might have a false perception/expectation of revenue elasticities. In this
section, we provide some tentative evidence for this assertion, using a large-scale
survey on local decision makers in the South–Western State of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(this survey was, for example, used in Janeba and Osterloh 2013). The survey allows
us to shed light on revenue expectations with regard to business taxation. It does
not include information about property taxation. The survey was conducted among
the mayors of all 1,108 municipalities in Baden–Wu¨rtemberg in May 2008. The
substantial response rate of 714 responses (64.4%) provides a reasonable picture of
mayors in the sample. Our survey question of interest is:
“What would be your assessment: By how many percent was your business tax
revenue to change after three years if you were to increase the local tax multiplier
from today’s level by 50 points?”.35
The respondents can give seven different evaluations of tax-revenue elasticities
using the following discrete categories: -10%, -10 to -5%, -5 to 0%, no change, 0 to
5%, 5 to 10% and above 10%.
Hence, the survey does not provide a continuous measure of the revenue elas-
ticity of local profit taxes (as estimated in our empirical analysis above) but rather
hints at the respondents’ general beliefs whether there will be positive or negative
revenue effects triggered by a significant tax rate increase and in what range that
change might probably come about.
Figure 4 provides an illustration of perceived tax rate elasticities of business
tax revenues in our survey sample. More than 60% of local politicians in the sample
think that a tax rate increase of the local business tax will increase their revenues.
This implies that most politicians in our sample believe that firm profits – the
tax base of local business tax – are rather immobile and that higher business-tax
profits can substantially increase revenues. This is somewhat in contrast with our
empirical findings which indicate that a tax increase does not significantly affect
revenues. 17.5% of respondents believe that the surveyed increase does not have an
effect on revenues. These expectations are in accordance with our findings. Roughly
distributional/social-policy concerns. Fairness and equity considerations are widely discussed in
the context of tax progressivity of non-linear taxes (Diamond and Saez 2011; Saez and Stantcheva
2017). For instance, Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that information about inequality raises the
public support for higher estate and top income tax rates. In our context, politicians might want
to set low property taxes to encourage individuals to own property and buy real-estate.
35Such an increase in absolute tax rate multipliers corresponds to a 15.4% increase for the average
German municipality in 2008 when evaluated at the respective sample mean.
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20% of all respondents think that an increase of the local business tax will lead to
a decline of their tax revenues. This is against our findings (with a non-significant
positive coefficient) but possibly informed by an earlier study by Buettner (2003)
who finds negative revenue effects of higher taxes.
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Figure 4: Distribution of perceived business tax revenue elasticities
Source: Survey data are taken from Janeba and Osterloh (2013).
This corresponds with evidence from two additional questions from the sur-
vey illustrated in Figure A.4 in the Appendix, illustrating the degree of perceived
importance of the business tax rate for firm location (Panel (a)) as well as the per-
ceived prevalence of profit shifting across municipal borders as a response to tax
rate changes on firm profits (Panel (b)). Panel (a) of Figure A.4 indicates that local
politicians think that the business tax rate has a positive but only marginal effect
for attracting firms to the community (centered around +1 responses). Panel (b) of
Figure A.4 indicates that the vast majority of respondents believe that firms might
engage somewhat in profit shifting but not to a large degree. This is evidence that
local politicians are aware of tax-competition concerns but they, however, somewhat
overestimate the revenue returns from increasing tax rates on firm profits.
What are the drivers behind beliefs about revenue elasticities? In order to shed
light on this, we apply two sets of analyses.36 First, we study the role of political
ideology for revenue beliefs. To do so, we run an ordered probit regression using the
36Results are available on request.
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survey question about revenue elasticities that we reported before (i.e. the same that
is used in Figure 4). We regress the answers to this questions on a set of variables
including a variable for the share of left-leaning political parties (or alternatively,
left majorities) in the respective municipal council. We find that incumbents from
left-majoritarian towns believe significantly more (less) in high positive (negative)
revenue elasticities. This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of several other
town-level characteristics. This finding corresponds with literature that identifies
political ideology to be a dominant driver of tax rate choices (Heinemann and Janeba
2011; Ashworth and Heyndels 1997; Janeba 2014; Janeba et al. 2017). These studies
commonly find that left-leaning politicians (or individuals) choose higher tax rates.37
Moreover, our findings are in line with the results of Heinemann and Janeba (2011)
who find left-leaning politicians to exert stronger beliefs in low capital mobility.38
Second, we aim to analyze the effect of political experience on expectations
regarding revenue elasticities of the respondents. Given data restrictions, we can
perform the respective analysis only on a smaller sub-sample of 294 respondents.39
Ordered probit models suggest that political experience does not affect beliefs on
revenue effects of business tax hikes. Note that, possibly due to data restrictions
we cannot identify effects of (the lack of) economic knowledge or education on
elasticity expectations for the local business tax in our sample. However, that does
not necessarily mean that such an mechanism does not exist.40
Our survey evidence suggests that local decision makers tend to underestimate
(overstate) business profit mobility (revenue effects) from tax increases as compared
to non-significant effects in our empirical results. We cannot find differences due
to advantageous political or economic information of our respondents. However,
expectations on mobility or tax revenue elasticities for the business tax might be
driven by party ideology with left-leaning politicians believing in stronger revenue
gains from tax hikes. Hence, local politics might have an incentive to increase
37Freier and Odendahl (2015), however, find that centre-left parties tend to decrease tax rates
and the Greens to even increase property tax rates.
38Our findings further indicate that mayors that are directly elected representatives are more
pessimistic about large revenue gains from tax rate hikes of the business tax as compared to
bureaucrats from local budget offices.
39We hand-collected personal information on politicians in our survey but only a fraction of 49%
survey respondents explicitly stated that they are mayors, most others said that they are in fact
local clerks in the local budget office. We gathered data on age, years in office, party affiliation,
having a doctoral degree and job type of mayor, i.e. being a full-time mayor or being on a part-
time mayor position. These data are only available for most mayors (294 out of 365), not for
respondents that stated to be bureaucrats from the local budget offices (381 individuals).
40Heinemann and Janeba (2011), however, found information background such as years in par-
liament, professional background (being self-employed) or financial committee membership to be
significant for German national politicians’ beliefs on international mobility of paper profits.
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business tax rate more than optimal in order to increase tax revenues. This might
be especially true since business tax revenues are on average more than three times
as high as property tax revenues (see Table 1). Unfortunately, our survey does not
allow us to make inference on revenue expectations from property tax changes.
6.2.2 Political economy reasons
The second assertion that we investigate is whether political-economy incentives are
the actual drivers of tax policy. That is, we test if tax rates are set depending on
strategic political behavior rather than depending on economic efficiency arguments.
To do so, we study the effects of elections on tax-rate setting in German municipal-
ities. That is, we study if tax setting behavior depends on the electoral cycle, i.e.
via differences in political budget cycles (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1990). Policy
makers might use the policy tools of business and property taxes in alternate ways
around election dates to send signals (i.e., competency, ability to ’act’, tax gifts)
and to stay in office.
We investigate differences in electoral cycles between the growth rates of busi-
ness tax and property rates by replicating the analysis of Foremny and Riedel (2014)
using our sample of all German municipalities in the period 1995-2010.41 Despite
having a larger sample including East Germany, a further difference to Foremny
and Riedel (2014) is that we study the electoral effects on business and property
taxes, while Foremny and Riedel (2014) focus on business taxes only. Identifying
variation comes from election dates of municipal councils which vary across federal
states and are fixed by the respective federal state’s constitution. This gives rise to
a DiD design in a fixed effects framework.
Specifically, we regress the yearly growth rates of either business and property
tax rates on dummies of election dates as well their respective leads and lags. We
control for municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects and account for time-
varying municipality and county characteristics (as we do in our main regressions;
see Section 4).
Models (I) and (II) of Table 5 show the results for specifications with and
without control variables. The coefficients depict the effect of election years, the
year before an election and the year after an election growth rates of tax rates,
always relative to the development of growth rates in municipalities that do not
have an election year (or are not in a year before an election or in a year afterward).
The results indicate that local politicians lower both business and property tax rates
41Our sample is larger than the sample of Foremny and Riedel (2014) as we include East Germany
and have a longer panel. Using their sample of West-German municipalities in 2002-2008, we yield
very similar results for the business tax rate growth rates.
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in the election year and the year before an election, where the effect is largest (in
absolute amounts) in the election year.
However, there are differences in election effects for business and property
taxes. First, growth rates of property taxes are decreased by more than twice as
much as growth rates of the business tax rate in the election year. Second, although
being decreased in the year prior to council elections, business tax rates are relatively
increased in the aftermath of municipal elections (see Model (II); this is similar to
Foremny and Riedel 2014), whereas property tax rates are even slightly decreased,
relatively, after the election.
Larger property tax effects in the election year might be due to a higher salience
and visibility of property taxes in Germany compared to the business tax. For in-
stance, Lo¨ﬄer and Siegloch (2015) show that not only house owners pay for the
property tax but in the medium run the economic incidence is fully shifted to ten-
ants. Politicians’ calculus might be that property taxes affect more people in the
municipality than business taxes, hence being a better instrument to gain more votes;
business tax is only paid by an arguably smaller group of (incorporated) business
owners which might not even necessarily live in the municipality’s jurisdiction.
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Table 5: Electoral cycles in business and property taxation, tax growth rates
(I) (II)
BT PT BT PT
Electiont−1 -0.111∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.065∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.023) (0.034)
Election -0.246∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.531∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.021) (0.030)
Electiont+1 -0.045
∗ -0.144∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.070∗
(0.023) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes
N 131,891 117,999 112,072 100,891
Notes: Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of business tax rates (depicted in BT columns)
or the yearly growth rate of property tax rates (depicted in PT columns). Fixed-effects regressions
based on Foremny and Riedel (2014) with standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors
are clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Coefficients for the pre-election, election, and post-election year are reported in Model (I) and
(II). Election dates across states in the sample period are taken from the statistical offices of the
German states. Administrative data on all German municipalities (except for German city states
due to comparability issues) in 1995-2010. The unit of observation is a single municipality. All
specifications include year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects. Model (II) includes controls
for population, local GDP, level of debt, number of employees, and disposable private income.
7 Conclusion
Using rich panel data on the universe of German municipalities between 1995 and
2010, this paper estimates how tax revenue generated from business and property
taxes responds to variation in the respective tax rates. We use two different es-
timation strategies to do this, an event-study design and a generalized DiD. Both
approaches yield similar results and indicate that property tax revenues increase
significantly and substantially after an increase in property taxes. In contrast, we
find small insignificant effects for the effects of business taxes on business-tax rev-
enues. This implies that business profits are rather tax sensitive whereas property
does not respond significantly in the short-run. Applying basic intuition based on
the inverse-elasticity rule, these elasticity estimates would suggest that average tax
rates are significantly higher on property relative to business-tax rates. However,
this is not what we observe in the data: on average, property values are consistently
taxed at lower rates than business profits. This suggests that actual local taxation
in Germany is inconsistent with the inverse-elasticity rule.
We provide some suggestive evidence and test two channels due to which mu-
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nicipalities would likely deviate from tax policies based on Ramsey results. We find
that higher business tax rates might accrue both to politician’s exaggerated expec-
tations about tax-revenue elasticities (partly due to political ideology) and lower
decreases of business tax rate growth along the electoral cycle, i.e. heterogeneous
importance of tax instruments to politician’s re-election concerns. However, in line
with the argumentation of Mankiw et al. (2009), more empirical work is needed to
learn whether real-world taxation complies with rules from optimal taxation.
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Appendix
A Summary statistics
Table A.1: Number of observations by year, 1995- 2010
Year N
1995 8980
1996 8964
1997 8956
1998 9507
1999 10522
2000 10551
2001 12363
2002 11890
2003 11622
2004 11654
2005 11693
2006 11874
2007 11935
2008 11605
2009 11470
2010 11084
Total 174670
Notes: Number of municipalities in each year for which data are available. Administrative data
on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to
observations for which information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue
is reported negative.
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Table A.2: Size of changes in BT multipliers, 1995- 2010
Year I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1995 0.03 0.09 0.50 0.10 85.60 5.35 7.85 0.46 0.03
1996 0.04 0.14 0.43 0.18 91.55 2.82 4.45 0.38 0.01
1997 0.04 0.15 0.33 0.20 91.17 2.33 5.40 0.32 0.05
1998 0.01 0.13 0.28 0.19 91.04 3.16 4.75 0.39 0.05
1999 0.06 0.14 0.48 0.25 95.37 1.37 2.14 0.18 0.00
2000 0.07 0.16 0.43 0.28 94.98 1.61 2.21 0.24 0.02
2001 0.01 0.10 0.44 0.30 91.99 3.65 3.11 0.34 0.06
2002 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.24 92.04 2.98 4.04 0.28 0.01
2003 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.30 90.31 2.72 6.14 0.22 0.02
2004 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.24 91.19 3.06 4.84 0.22 0.05
2005 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.28 88.88 4.16 5.96 0.29 0.01
2006 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.37 91.80 3.91 3.12 0.25 0.06
2007 0.02 0.04 0.40 0.38 95.50 1.69 1.78 0.15 0.04
2008 0.00 0.09 0.45 0.32 95.71 1.12 1.88 0.40 0.03
2009 0.00 0.05 0.57 0.50 95.16 1.11 2.28 0.30 0.03
2010 0.03 0.04 0.30 0.48 90.21 2.29 5.82 0.80 0.04
Total 0.03 0.09 0.38 0.30 92.18 2.65 4.02 0.32 0.03
Notes: Share of municipalities which change their business-tax multiplier in the range of the
following nine categories, I - IX, by year. I: < −100; II: −100 ≤ change < −50; III: −50 ≤
change < −10; IV : −10 ≤ change < 0; V: no change; VI: 0 < change ≤ 10; VII: 10 < change
≤ 50; VIII: 50 < change ≤ 100; IX: change> 100. Municipal level variable. Administrative data
on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to
observations for which information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue
is reported negative.
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Table A.3: Size of changes in PT multipliers, 1995- 2010
Year I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1995 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.04 81.03 3.44 13.99 1.07 0.10
1996 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.10 89.40 2.15 7.49 0.56 0.00
1997 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.21 87.06 2.56 9.09 0.80 0.01
1998 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.14 87.60 3.03 8.35 0.56 0.05
1999 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.16 93.75 1.57 4.05 0.18 0.03
2000 0.00 0.07 0.34 0.13 94.05 1.37 3.90 0.14 0.01
2001 0.00 0.26 0.28 0.20 91.70 3.45 3.82 0.25 0.02
2002 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.12 90.03 2.35 6.62 0.66 0.04
2003 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.07 86.65 2.17 8.72 2.15 0.07
2004 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.13 86.74 2.57 9.62 0.79 0.02
2005 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.15 85.02 3.53 10.34 0.77 0.04
2006 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.19 90.02 2.62 6.38 0.50 0.07
2007 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.23 94.30 1.28 3.51 0.28 0.03
2008 0.01 0.08 0.53 0.30 95.00 1.20 2.68 0.18 0.01
2009 0.01 0.11 0.51 0.44 94.93 1.00 2.80 0.19 0.03
2010 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.51 87.12 2.16 8.64 1.11 0.12
Total 0.01 0.06 0.25 0.20 89.86 2.23 6.71 0.64 0.04
Notes: Share of municipalities which change their property-tax multiplier in the range of the
following nine categories, I - IX, by year. I: < −100; II: −100 ≤ change < −50; III: −50 ≤
change < −10; IV : −10 ≤ change < 0; V: no change; VI: 0 < change ≤ 10; VII: 10 < change
≤ 50; VIII: 50 < change ≤ 100; IX: change> 100. Municipal level variable. Administrative data
on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to
observations for which information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue
is reported negative.
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Table A.4: Share of municipalities with higher tax rates on BT than PT by year
Year Mean
1995 0.567
1996 0.565
1997 0.555
1998 0.513
1999 0.472
2000 0.468
2001 0.574
2002 0.582
2003 0.582
2004 0.562
2005 0.546
2006 0.539
2007 0.534
2008 0.532
2009 0.537
2010 0.547
Total 0.543
Notes: The table depicts for each year the share of municipalities that have a higher multiplier on
business-profits than on propety. Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of
German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which
information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Figure A.1: BT (left) and PT (right) multipliers in 2001
Notes: The Figure depicts the spatial distribution and levels of business-tax (left) and property-tax
(right) multipliers in 2001. Own compilation with geoinformation provided by the GeoDataCenter
(Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).
Figure A.2: BT (left) and PT (right) multipliers in 2010
Notes: The Figure depicts the spatial distribution and levels of business-tax (left) and property-tax
(right) multipliers in 2010. Own compilation with geoinformation provided by the GeoDataCenter
(Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).
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Figure A.3: Frequency of reform types for BT and PT in 1995-2010
Notes: Number of tax reforms per reform category in business tax (Panel (a)) and property tax
(Panel (b)). Reform categories are tax increase, large tax increase (greater than or equal to the
75th percentile of the tax increase distribution), or a tax decrease (see legend).
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Figure A.4: Beliefs on business tax rate effects
Source: Survey data are taken from Janeba and Osterloh (2013).
Panel (a) question reads “The rate of the local business tax is said to be a motive to be considered
for firms when making their location choice. How important do you think is the size of the local
business tax rate for a firm’s location choice?”. Respondents can chose answers ranging from
entirely unimportant (-4) to very important (4). Panel (b) question reads “Companies presumably
use tax planning instruments to relocate ”paper” profits from high-tax to low-tax municipalities.
How widespread do you think is this phenomenon?”. Respondents can chose answers ranging from
not widespread at all (-4) to very widespread (4).
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B Robustness checks
Table B.1: Robustness checks: Sample variations
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Tax revenue business Tax revenue property
Panel A: Balanced Panel
mBTt−1 0.130 0.122
(0.127) (0.124)
mPTt−1 0.695∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
N 74,760 73,172 74,760 73,172
R2 0.203 0.194 0.753 0.772
Panel B: No Overlap of Reform Years in BT and PT
mBTt−1 0.172∗ 0.155
(0.094) (0.098)
mPTt−1 0.642∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
N 120,637 105,828 123,566 108,682
R2 0.148 0.155 0.557 0.623
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on equation ((2)) with standard errors in parentheses. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05,
∗∗∗ < 0.01. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years in baseline: 1995
to 2010. The dependent variable in columns (I) and (II) is municipality-level tax revenue gener-
ated from the local business tax (BT), and municipality-level tax revenue from the local property
tax (PT) in columns (III) and (IV). The independent variable of interest is the municipality-level
tax multiplier in t − 1. Reported coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities identified from tax
reforms. All specifications include year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and federal-state
specific fixed effects. Columns (I) and (III) do not include controls. Columns (II) and (IV) add
lagged controls for population, local GDP, level of debt, number of employees, and private income.
Panel A is identical to the baseline results in Table 3 but estimated on a balanced sample of mu-
nicipalities. Panel B cuts observations from the unbalanced panel in which there are reforms in
both the business and property tax rates in a given municipality.
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C Event-study results
Table C.1: Event-study estimates: Baseline effects
Business tax Property tax
Large hike Hike Drop Large hike Hike Drop
F3 -0.030 -0.032* 0.053 0.004 0.006*** 0.002
(0.034) (0.018) (0.078) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020)
F2 0.002 0.012 -0.114 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.032) (0.015) (0.106) (0.003) (0.002) (0.021)
L0 0.045 0.017 0.062 0.112*** 0.077*** -0.103***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.079) (0.003) (0.002) (0.025)
L1 0.039 0.043** 0.130* 0.115*** 0.078*** -0.106***
(0.034) (0.018) (0.074) (0.004) (0.002) (0.025)
L2 0.056* 0.039** 0.166* 0.114*** 0.074*** -0.138***
(0.033) (0.020) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) (0.029)
L3 0.021 0.039* 0.021 0.113*** 0.071*** -0.134***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.093) (0.005) (0.003) (0.038)
N 36,217 36,217 14,910 37,126 37,126 10,614
Notes: The table depicts the event study estimates from Figure 2. We do not show end points
of the 4–4 window in this table for the following reason: We bin up event dummies at the
end points of the event window. So the dummies Dj,4i,t and D
j,−4
i,t account for all events four
or more years away from the event. This is necessary because reform years differ across mu-
nicipalities. Because of this procedure, we do not plot the endpoint estimates in our event-
study graphs. We also do not plot them in the respective Figure 2. Robust standard errors
clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Figure C.1: Event-study graphs: Alternative event window with -5 to 5 years
Notes: Panel (a) plots event study estimates for property tax rate reforms on the log property tax
revenues. Panel (b) illustrates the related findings for the business tax. Both panels show event-
study estimates (γj ; j[−4; +4]), i.e. without window ends, for the baseline scenario of a 5 to 5 year
event window and the corresponding 90% (vertical line) and 95% confidence bands (horizontal line)
for different reform types of equation 1. Event variables are dummies equal to one for a tax increase,
a large tax increase (greater than or equal to the 75th percentile of the tax increase distribution),
or a tax decrease (see legend). In specifications with tax increase (decrease) dummies, we exclude
all municipalities that experienced a tax decrease (increase) during the observation period. We
also balance our event-study such that only tax reforms are included that are observed throughout
the whole event window, here 5 years before and after the reform.
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Figure C.2: Event-study graphs: Alternative event window with -3 to 3 years
Notes: Panel (a) plots event study estimates for property tax rate reforms on the log property tax
revenues. Panel (b) illustrates the related findings for the business tax. Both panels show event-
study estimates (γj ; j[−2; +2]), i.e. without window ends, for the baseline scenario of a 3 to 3 year
event window and the corresponding 90% (vertical line) and 95% confidence bands (horizontal line)
for different reform types of equation 1. Event variables are dummies equal to one for a tax increase,
a large tax increase (greater than or equal to the 75th percentile of the tax increase distribution),
or a tax decrease (see legend). In specifications with tax increase (decrease) dummies, we exclude
all municipalities that experienced a tax decrease (increase) during the observation period. We
also balance our event-study such that only tax reforms are included that are observed throughout
the whole event window, here 3 years before and after the reform.
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